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I. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS TOWARD MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. Current Communist Strategy. The present Chinese Communist strategy toward revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia apparently is to provide these movements with moral support and limited military assistance, in order to facilitate the establishment wherever possible both of Communist-controlled native armies operating from strategic bases accessible to Communist China and of Communist regimes on China's periphery. Peiping seems to have supplied military aid on a significant scale only to those movements that have already demonstrated both viability and political reliability. Communist China seems to have observed the restriction that Southeast Asian movements should supply their own manpower and that Chinese "volunteers" should be utilized on a strictly limited and covert basis in technical and advisory positions. To date major quantities of materiel, advisors, and training facilities seem to have been provided only to the forces of Ho Chi Minh, with the Communist movements of Burma and Malaya receiving limited assistance.

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official as stating that (2) the DRV Army does not require the aid of Chinese troops so long as no "united armed interference" is undertaken by the "imperialists;" (b) it is the "privilege and duty" of the Chinese Communist Party to give "moral support and technical aid" to Asian

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revolutionary movements; (c) adequate military forces must be stationed on China's borders to resist possible attacks by the "imperialists" who may utilize Kuomintang remnants against Communist China. This report seems to describe the policy that has so far been followed by the Peiping regime.)

B. Recent Indications of a Possible Change in Strategy. During

25X1C recent weeks [REDACTED] purported Chinese Communist preparations for more active intervention in Indo-25X1C china and possible Burma and Thailand. [REDACTED]

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25X1C [REDACTED] In particular, it appears probable that additional Chinese Communist troops have been moved into the provinces on China's southern border and that communications facilities on both sides of the Sino-Vietnamese border have been improved and repaired. In addition, Communist propaganda from all sources concerning alleged Western plans for "aggression" in Southeast Asia has been greatly stepped up during 25X1C recent weeks. [REDACTED] airfield improvements within jet range of Indochina, of the reequipping of Chinese troops near the border with Soviet supplies, of stepped-up materiel deliveries to the DRV forces, and of stockpiling of military equipment on the Chinese side of the border [REDACTED] 25X1C

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None of the available data provides any conclusive evidence concerning Chinese Communist intentions. Troop movements, materiel stockpiling, and communications improvements could all be explained as aspects of Peiping's announced program of military modernization and economic reconstruction, while the propaganda build-up could be merely a phase of the current world Communist campaign to demonstrate the "aggressive" intent underlying American proposals for a Korean settlement, for mutual security, and for the UN collective measures committee.

C. Factors Underlying a Possible Shift in Communist Strategy.

More active Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia could conceivably be initiated for either of two general reasons: (a) the Communist leadership may feel that an increase in Chinese intervention would pay a sizeable dividend either in terms of the area conquered for Communism or in terms of the resulting attrition of Western strength; or (b) the Communist leadership may fear a serious military threat either to the DRV or to South China which could not be countered by present policies. In either case, the Communist leadership would face the questions of whether Southeast Asia represents the most suitable and urgent locale for increased military activity, whether Chinese military intervention is the most suitable strategy, what would be the impact of military intervention on other world Communist objectives, and, most important of all, what would be the probable western counter-measures to Chinese intervention. The last of these considerations may be the crucial one.

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D. Present Communist Estimate of Western Intentions. Recent Western developments and statements, particularly those following the Singapore Conference, the Washington Tripartite talks on Southeast Asia, and the Truman-Churchill talks (including statements by Eden, Juin, Truman, and Churchill) almost certainly have been studied by the Communists as indications of possible Western intentions in regard to Southeast Asia, as have recent domestic developments in France. Judging from the Communist propaganda reaction to these events, the Communists appear to have noted, on the one hand, the area of disagreement between the US, the UK, and France on Far Eastern problems and the growing dissatisfaction within France with the course of the war in Indochina, and on the other, the repeatedly expressed Western determination to resist Communist aggression and to prevent future Korean -- the latter interpreted by the propaganda as indications of Western "aggressive intentions." It is likely that the Communists have concluded that the West may resist overt aggression in Southeast Asia with determination-- a conclusion that is reinforced by experiences in Korea -- but that the West would probably react with less resolution and vigor to a gradual deterioration of the anti-Communist position in the area. It is probable that the Communists do not expect at this time a determined and effective effort to extirpate Communist movements in Indochina and Burma. In general, the Communists probably feel that they have the initiative in Southeast Asia and that effective Western action will not be forthcoming during the next few months if Communist objectives

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are pursued with sufficient subtlety, but that there is considerable danger of a strong western reaction if an overt Chinese invasion is attempted. It cannot be determined whether the Communists view this danger as great enough to be a serious deterrent to aggression in Southeast Asia, particularly in view of the uncertain effect on the Communist estimate of western intentions of recent domestic political developments in the US and France, of the British preoccupation in the Near East, and of statements from various American sources that the US does not plan to commit troops to Southeast Asia.

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